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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The unification of Europe into one political and economic entity 
has been a dream of many Europeans for many years. Efforts have been 
made to unite these nations in different ways, sometimes by force, 
sometimes voluntarily. Either way, the end goal is the same — the 
creation of a single European Community. How to achieve this goal is 
almost as controversial as the idea itself. Many plans have been laid, 
and many have been destroyed, blocked by member nations or simply 
labeled as impossible. 
The path towards European integration has been a long and difficult 
one. Several attempts have been made to unify Europe, by such legendary 
rulers as Charlemagne and Napolean. Hitler also tried to unite Europe 
under the ideology of Nazism. The first voluntary efforts were in the 
1920s with the creation of the Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg) customs union. Other steps along the way have included the 
creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the 
common defense of Europe and the Council of Europe to deal with the 
social and cultural issues the developing Community would face. 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the newest phase 
and it was a major step in the evolution of the Community. Euratom, a 
nuclear power consortium, was also implemented soon after. The Treaty 
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of Rome in 1957 was perhaps the greatest stride towards European 
integration. It created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
institutions that would manage this new creation, the Court of Justice, 
the Commission, and the Council of Ministers. Up to this point, 
attempts at integration had been mainly economic. In the late 1960s, 
the existing institutions of the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom were 
combined to create the European Community (EC) that the world now knows. 
The introduction of the political dimension to the Community made the 
institutions created by the Treaty of Rome — the Court of Justice, the 
Commission, and the Council of Ministers — even more important. The 
introduction of two more proposals to more closely integrate — the 
Single European Act adopted in the late 1980s and the possible adoption 
of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s — further increases the 
importance of the roles of these political institutions in the European 
Community. The task of this paper will be to examine the most powerful 
of these institutions, the Council of Ministers. 
The Council of Ministers is for all practical purposes the center 
of power in the European Community. Most major decisions are made here, 
decisions that affect not only the Community as a whole, but also the 
member nations as well. The members of the Council are the foreign 
ministers of each nation, which makes them answerable to their own 
particular nations. But the ministers are supposed to also foster the 
growth of the Community as a whole, which may not always be in the best 
interest of the minister's nation. It is contradictions such as these 
that make the Council's job a difficult one to execute. 
This paper seeks to carefully and thoroughly examine the Council of 
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Ministers as an institution of the European Community, explaining its 
importance in Community affairs and also examining the various functions 
that the Council performs. It will also explore the various problems 
that exist in the Council. While the paper will offer some suggestions 
as to how to relieve some of these problems, it will remain primarily 
diagnostic. Although the Council of Ministers does have several serious 
obstacles that keep it from functioning as fully as it could, the amount 
of success it has achieved is amazing considering the many political 
pitfalls it and its members must face daily. Perhaps someday, some of 
these problems will be solved, or at least lessened, and the Community 
will be able to achieve its dream of complete unification with less 
conflict than it has endured in its past. 
Chapter Two 
The Evolution of the European Community 
The creation of an entity known as the European Community has not 
been a simple journey by anyone's definition. What are the motivations 
for the creation of such a community? According to A.H. Robinson in his 
book European Institutions, there were three principle reasons for the 
development of the community. The first was the need for international 
cooperation in almost every area of government. Robinson says that such 
organizations are set up by practical governments to meet practical 
needs. The European Community could possibly provide allies in time of 
war, economic stimulus, cultural exchanges and many other benefits for 
the member nations. The second factor is the increased importance of 
regionalism. Many organizations established around the same time as the 
EEC were regionally oriented organizations. All focus on a certain 
region of the world. Regions could unite and take care of themselves. 
If a peaceful world could not be achieved, at least a peaceful region 
could be accomplished. The third and final reason was the widespread 
desire for European unity. Such unity had been called for from Count 
Coudenhove-Kalergi's "Pan-European Union" in 1924 to Aristide Briand's 
"European Federal Union" in 1930 to the speech of Winston Churchill in 
1946 calling for a "United States of Europe" (Robertson 4). The 
combination of these reasons and others prompted the development of the 
4 
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institution now known as the European Community. 
Perhaps another reason for the establishment of the Community was 
the fact that Europe had tired of fighting in wars and now desired 
peace. A large part of the history of the nations of Europe has been 
spent in wars, sometimes with an outside enemy but more often amongst 
themselves. Many of the earliest attempts to unite Europe were based on 
war and territorially-driven desires. 
Integration Theories 
How to integrate Europe was a complicated manner. Several theories 
were developed to explain how and why the nations would integrate. 
The functional school is one of the oldest in the field of international 
integration. Led by such noted scholars as David Mitrany, the 
functionalists theorized that supranational organizations, such as the 
institutions of the EC which are above the national governments, would 
gradually take over the functions of the national governments which are 
no longer able to perform their duties satisfactorily. The 
international community would grow from the satisfaction of the common 
needs of the member nations. The loyalties would naturally shift from 
national to supranational. 
Mitrany discusses the functionalist approach in his book, A Working 
Peace System. His functional approach would link authority to a 
specific activity, thereby eliminating the fear of a supranational 
leviathan. What Mitrany argues is that governments should organize 
"along the lines of specific needs and ends, and according to the 
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conditions of their times and place, in lieu of the traditional 
organization in the basis of a set constitutional division of 
jurisdiction and rights and powers" (54). Mitrany also states that the 
supranational government simply does what the national governments do, 
only on a larger scale. The surrendering of member states' sovereignty 
would be in functional areas, not an indiscriminate transfer of power. 
By giving an agency or government authority to carry out a task, 
sovereignty is transferred from the old power to the new. This is done 
slowly so that national governments have time to adjust and the 
supranational governments have time to develop institutions to handle 
the new functions. Mitrany calls this "not ... [a] surrender but a 
sharing of the sovereignty" (31). All member nations would share in the 
decision-making and also in the benefits of the decisions. 
Another theoretical movement that later evolved refuted some of the 
functionalists' points. The new theorists, called neo-functionalists, 
believed that factors such as past history and cultural differences were 
important in formulating theory. These aspects were largely ignored by 
the functionalists. The most important issue to the neo-functionalists 
is that of political community. In The Uniting of Europe. Ernst Haas 
defines political community as the "condition in which specific groups 
and individuals show more loyalty to their central political 
authority than to any other political authority, in a specific time and 
definable geographic space" (5). In order to be able to participate in 
the integration process, a state must have an industrialized economy 
involved in international economics and trade. The society of the state 
must be politically mobile and channelled through interest groups and 
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political parties. The community is said to flourish if interest 
groups and political parties at the national level endorse supranational 
activity over that of the national government, or if it is organized 
beyond the national level to function as a decision-making device if the 
interests are defined in terms larger than the state. The community 
flourishes if there is a common ideology beyond the national level and 
if the governments negotiate directly and if they negotiate in good 
faith. 
Haas feels that it is best to analyze this system within the 
framework of the ideal type, using strict definitions. Political 
integration is viewed not as a condition, but as a process. It takes 
place when perceptions fall into a certain pattern. In order for 
integration to take place, the values of the government must undergo 
change. The national group values must be superseded by new and larger 
sets of beliefs. Interests must be redefined in terms of regional 
interests instead of national ones. Over time, the loyalties of the 
people will also shift from the national to the supranational. The 
success of neo-functionalism as a whole rests on the political elites 
who are expected to guide the rest of the nations in joining the 
supranational organization. If the elites fail to convince the people, 
integration is stopped dead in its tracks. 
The intergovernmentalist approach differs greatly from that of the 
functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches. Paul Taylor, in his 
book The Limits of European Integration, explores the views that the 
intergovernmentalists hold. In this theory, the national governments 
cooperate with each other, but with no loss of sovereignty. 
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Intergovernmental ism calls for a unified core of states to lead the way 
and set the tone for the rest of Europe to follow. Taylor sees three 
trends in European integration. The first is centralization. When the 
twelve member nations agreed to the Single European Act, they 
transferred some power to a central authority. The second is 
internationalization. The nations which have supported integration have 
done so because their mindset was already an international one. The 
third trend is expansionism. Taylor illustrates this point by stating 
the example of the original six members of the EC . When they allowed 
other nations to join, they exhibited their expansionist ideas. The key 
to intergovernmental ism is harmonization. If all nations work together, 
much can be accomplished. If the nations choose not to cooperate, the 
attempts at integration will fail. 
From this brief theoretical overview of integration theory, one can 
see its importance in how the EC is to be structured. Examples can be 
cited to fit each theory. Some parts of the Maastricht treaty, such as 
the free movement of people, are functionalist; the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) proposed in Maastricht could be viewed as intergovernmental 
since no nation is surrendering sovereignty over its currency at this 
time. The outcome of this debate will have a great effect on the future 
path of integration — a functional or neo-functional, supranational 
approach would indicate a "United States of Europe" while an 
intergovernmentalist approach would call for a structure similar to the 
US Confederacy. 
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Attempts to Unite Europe 
The earliest known attempt to join the nations of Europe was in the 
700s AD, when the Holy Roman Empire was at its height. Charlemagne 
tried to capture all of Europe and nearly succeeded, but died before the 
feat was completed. The vast kingdom he ruled was divided among his 
grandsons who did manage to unite nearly all of Europe. Eventually, the 
grip upon Europe loosened, and although there were attempts to regain 
control of the European empire by many others, including Napoleon, none 
could succeed. The empire was simply too vast to rule. 
Peace was a precious and rare commodity. Eventually, the rulers of 
Europe tired of the large economic and human losses and began to propose 
a sort of "European Confederation", mainly to protect themselves from 
outside threats like the Turks. However, European infighting was too 
great for such an idea and it was never brought to life (Kerr 4). 
The idea was forgotten until French Foreign Minister Aristide 
Briand revived it in 1929. He presented it to the League of Nations 
that year and to the European governments the next year. However, the 
rise of Nazism had begun and attention was directed to other areas. 
Fighting soon erupted and the concept was once again buried. Many 
scholars now regard this as a "missed opportunity" that could have 
possibly diverted the ensuing war had proper attention been given to 
Briand's plan (Barrington and Cooney 12). 
10 
The Beginnings of the Cororoumty 
When the war ended, Europe was completely devastated. Nearly the 
whole continent needed rebuilding; yet nearly every nation's coffers 
were drained from the long and expensive war. Europe was at a 
crossroads. She had two options. She could enlist the aid of 
foreigners, namely the United States (US), to help in the rebuilding 
effort, or she could bind together the nations of Europe to rebuild in a 
cooperative effort. The United States did, in fact, offer to help 
rebuild Europe with the Marshall Plan. To administer this aid, the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created. 
Although membership in the organization was not limited to only European 
countries, the adoption of this association may have been the first real 
precursor to the Community itself, because members pledged 
to combine their economic strength, to join together to make 
the fullest collective use of their individual capacities and 
potentialities, to increase their production, develop and 
modernize their industrial and agricultural equipment, reduce 
progressively barriers to trade amongst themselves, promote 
full employment and restore or maintain the stability of their 
economies and general confidence in their national currencies 
(Walsh and Paxton 7). 
This action indeed paved the way for European integration. 
The Congress of Europe held in 1948 was also a significant event in 
the history of the European Community. It called for a number of 
things, including a Court of Justice, a European Assembly, and a charter 
for Human Rights, all of which were later incorporated into the European 
Community. The Congress adopted resolutions that would cause these 
things to be. The Council of Europe was established in 1949. Its main 
dealings were with cultural and social issues such as human rights. It 
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was the most politically oriented organization founded up to that time. 
The OEEC was primarily economic in nature and NATO, established in 1947 
with the help of the United States, was essentially a military 
organization. The Council of Europe marked the first time that the 
Europeans had agreed upon operating in a political arena. 
The European Coal and Steel Community 
The greatest progress made on the economic front was achieved with 
the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community by the Treaty of 
Paris in 1952. It was officially proposed in 1950 by Robert Schuman, 
French Foreign Minister. It was primarily created to aid in economic 
development of all nations, but also helped end the disagreement between 
Germany and France over the Saar valley. By making both countries equal 
in the organization, the rivalry was eased somewhat (Lister 8). Britain 
refused to relinquish any sovereignty over the areas of coal and steel 
but did not try to block the other nations from forming such a union if 
they so desired. 
The ECSC encompassed many different types of products, including 
raw materials, pig iron, crude steel, and other outputs. It created 
basically a free trade area for the nations involved, which provided a 
great economic stimulus for the sluggish post-war economies. The 
primary aim was for the Community to "establish conditions which will in 
themselves assure the most rational distribution of production at the 
highest level of productivity, while safeguarding the continuity of 
employment and avoiding the creation of fundamental and persistent 
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disturbances in the economies of the member states" (Lister 13). 
There were several fundamental characteristics of the ECSC. First, 
all nations were placed under the supervision of a High Authority, which 
will be discussed later. To protect vital national interests, the 
Council of Ministers, the focus of this paper, was formed. A 
parliamentary assembly was set up along with a consultative assembly to 
guide the ECSC, along with a Court of Justice to ensure that all rules 
were abided by. The ECSC was also responsible for the elimination of 
customs duties. For an organization that was supposed to be essentially 
an economic venture, there were certainly many political features 
attached to it. 
The political institutions which the ECSC set up are worth further 
discussion because they are all present in one form or another in the 
structure of the current European Community. The High Authority, now 
known as the Commission, was composed of nine members who served for 
periods of six years. Decisions were made by majority rule and the 
Authority could take three sorts of actions — decisions, 
recommendations, and opinions. Decisions were always binding, 
recommendations were binding as to their end goal, but not as to how to 
achieve the end goal, and opinions were never binding (Robinson 154). 
The main function of the Authority was to govern the expansion of the 
economy. The Authority also had the power to raise money to fund the 
Community by levying taxes on the production of coal and steel. In 
later years, it was also active in the social facet of the ECSC as well, 
dealing with areas such as hygiene and safety (Lister 400). 
The Authority did not rule the ECSC alone, however. Some checks 
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and balances had been placed on the system to keep the Authority from 
becoming too powerful. One of these bodies was the Consultative 
Committee, which consisted of fifty-one members drawn from producers, 
workers and consumers. The Authority could consult the Committee 
whenever it deemed necessary for opinions on policy matters and other 
related areas. 
The ECSC also established a Special Council of Ministers, known 
today as the Council of Ministers. It was composed of one minister for 
each member government and acted as a liaison between the ECSC and the 
member governments. This was needed to keep both the ECSC and the 
member governments on the same track concerning certain economic 
policies. The ECSC could make all the policies it desired, but if they 
were in complete conflict with the policies of the member nations, the 
policies would not be followed. The Council of Ministers helped to 
ensure that conflict would not occur. 
Another important check over the power of the ECSC was the Common 
Assembly, now known as the European Parliament. It debated and 
discussed the annual reports of the High Authority and also had the 
power to make the Authority to resign if the Assembly voted for the 
Authority to do so. The Court of Justice had the power to annul certain 
decisions of the Authority in certain situations, limiting the rule of 
the Authority even further. 
The Authority has been called a supranational organization. The 
basic meaning of "supranational" is over and above the government of the 
individual states which belong to that particular organization. At this 
stage in the development of the European Community, the creation of a 
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supranational organization is phenomenal. A.H. Robinson (164) lists 
four characteristics that would determine the supranational nature of an 
organization. The first is the ability to negotiate agreements without 
any national involvement. The second is the ability to make decisions 
which are binding but call upon the national governments to carry them 
out. The third is the ability to take decisions based on the ability to 
implement them without the help of the national governments, and the 
fourth is the power to make decisions that are binding upon the national 
business without the involvement of the national governments. Based 
upon the previous discussion of the High Authority and its powers, it 
appears that the Authority was indeed a supranational authority. This 
point is important because throughout the evolution of the European 
Community, a debate has raged concerning whether such institutions are 
supranational or intergovernmental in nature. 
The next step in the formation of the European Community was the 
ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC). A being known as the 
European Political Community (EPC) was also tied to the EDC. The aim of 
the EDC was to protect Europe from outside attack. It was also to 
establish a common foreign policy in conjunction with the EPC. Four 
member states ratified, and Germany eventually did, but with a great 
internal struggle. A change in government had left France with too 
little support for the EDC, and the French government rejected it, even 
though Rene Pleven, a French Foreign Minister, had introduced it. The 
EPC, with no defense community to stand upon, died with it (Nicoll and 
Salmon 10-11). 
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The Treaty of Rome 
The seminal event in the progression towards a European Community 
was the signing of the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957 (Leonard 23). 
There were actually two treaties signed that day. The first created the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the second created Euratom, a 
nuclear power association. The EEC had eleven important principles: 
1) the elimination of customs duties and restrictions on import 
and export quotas 
2) a common customs duty and commercial policies 
3) the free movement of persons, services and capital 
4) a common agricultural policy 
5) a common transport policy 
6) equal competition for all member states 
7) harmonization of economic policies 
8) harmonization of local city and community laws 
9) establishment of a Social Fund 
10) establishment of an Investment Bank 
11) association of some overseas nations and territories (Hene 24- 
25). 
The so-called "Common Market", as the European Community is often known, 
was to be established in twelve years in three stages of four years 
each. In other words, changes were to be slow and incremental, not 
quick and complete. 
The Treaty of Rome also established four institutions to carry out 
the new directives for the creation of the EEC. The institutions were 
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quite obviously based on the institutions of the ECSC, although the two 
communities were separate for many years. The institutions were to be 
an Assembly, a Council of Ministers, a Commission, and a Court of 
Justice. The Court of Justice and the Assembly were to be joint with 
the ECSC, but the Councils and the Commissions were to be entirely 
separate from one another. 
The Treaty set out many rules for the governing of the new 
Community. The Treaty had no date of termination and had no provisions 
for the resignation or expulsion of a member state. The organization 
was very federal in its nature, where no member could force any decision 
on any other member and all votes on major issues would have to be 
passed with a unanimous vote. This is in sharp contrast to the 
supranationality of an organization such as the High Authority of the 
ECSC. 
The other community established by the Treaty of Rome was the 
European Atomic Energy Community, more commonly known as Euratom. Its 
main objective was to stimulate research in the area of nuclear power 
and its peaceful uses. Euratom set up four research facilities 
throughout Europe that are still active today — one in Italy, one in 
Belgium, one in Germany, and one in the Netherlands. Euratom is also 
responsible for the Community's energy policy. It is generally left out 
of most discussions of the European Community, simply because it has not 
played a very large role in the Community of late. Yet it is important 
because it was another step on the road to closer union for Europe. 
At this point in the Community, only six governments were member 
nations — Belgium, Italy, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the 
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Netherlands. As early as 1959, the stage was being set for further 
enlargement of the Commumty. By November of that year, the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) had been established, with members of 
Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. While none of these nations were members of the European 
Economic Community at that time, it showed that most of the nations of 
Europe were willing to work and join together to form a larger 
governmental entity. Nearly all customs duties were removed as part of 
the EFTA agreement. Only tariffs on agricultural products remained 
(Walsh and Paxton 10). The main difference between the EEC and EFTA was 
the fact that individual nations could set their own tariffs for imports 
from non-member nations in EFTA while they were mandated by the 
Community under the EEC. 
Two years after the establishment of the EEC, the United Kingdom 
(UK) made a formal application to join the EEC. Negotiations were 
difficult and the UK's application was finally rejected. Five member 
nations had voted for acceptance but France opposed the UK's entrance, 
fearing that it would lose its place of high standing in the EEC. 
Britain applied again in 1967, but no decision was ever made upon this 
application. 
The Merging of the Communities 
In 1969, the three European Communities — the ECSC, the EEC, and 
Euratom — merged to form the present-day European Community (EC). This 
merger created the institutions the Community uses today and gave each 
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one its powers, limits, and responsibilities. 
The tasks of the Commission are listed in Article 155 of the Treaty 
of Rome: initiative, supervision, and implementation. It is the 
Commission's general responsibility to see that all decisions are 
implemented, but it also has the right to put proposals before the 
Council of Ministers. The Commission has a wide range of authority, 
inherited mainly from the High Authority of the ECSC when the merging of 
Communities took place. It also has power concerning the agriculture 
and commercial policies of the EC. The Commission originally consisted 
of 17 members, two each from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, 
and one each from the remaining member states. This was revised by the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty to twelve members, one from each member state. 
The president of the Commission is appointed for a two year term, 
although most serve four (Hene 30). Five other commissioners are 
appointed as vice presidents. Each commissioner is assigned an area of 
responsibility and is also granted a small staff of six persons or so to 
help him or her carry out the assigned tasks. The Commission meets once 
a week regularly, though additional meetings may be scheduled if 
necessary. The Commission is based in Brussels and most day-to-day 
business is carried out in English or French, but all documents are 
translated into the nine official languages of the European Community. 
The European Parliament, known as the Assembly in the days of the 
ECSC, is intended to be the democratic part of the EC but its powers are 
severely limited. Direct elections were instituted in 1979, and its 
numbers have increased substantially since its inception. Yet it has 
received no more power despite its increased membership and the fact 
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that it is the only body elected by the citizenry of the European 
Community. There are three main areas of responsibility of the 
Parliament. It has supervisory powers over the Commission and the 
Council, and it also has budgetary powers. They may also elect to 
participate in the legislative process. Its legislative role is 
primarily an advisory one. There are certain areas in which the Council 
cannot pass legislation without first consulting with the Parliament. 
While the Council holds the real budgetary power, no budget can be 
passed without the consent of the Parliament. The Parliament meets for 
one week each month except August, and has additional meetings in March 
and October to discuss agricultural prices. Most of the work is done in 
committees and subcommittees. It is based in Strasbourg, and the 
members of Parliament (MEPs) are elected for five year terms. There is 
not, however, a common system for election of the MEPs, which 
complicates the election process. MEPs are not seated according to 
national affiliation but according to party affiliation. This allows 
some of the ties to national governments to be relaxed, and allows 
ideological ties to be strengthened. 
The Court of Justice has the task of ensuring that the law of the 
Community is accordance with the various treaties of the EC. It is 
composed of thirteen judges and six advocates-general. They are 
appointed for six year terms, with half the Court being replaced every 
three years. The advocates-general are appointed on the same basis. 
There are six types of cases that can come before the Court. They are 
disputes between member states, between the EC and members states, 
between the institutions of the EC, between individuals, corporate 
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bodies and the Community, opinions on international agreements, and 
preliminary rulings on cases referred by national courts (Leonard 47). 
The Court of Justice is supreme because there is no appeal against its 
decisions. It is the only court in the Community and has no relation to 
the twelve lower courts of the member governments. Cases may be brought 
by a member state, by an EC institution, or by a corporate body or 
individual. The Court of Justice helps to ensure that Community law is 
followed and fairly applied throughout the EC. 
A fourth EC institution was added in 1974. The European Council, 
which is made up of the heads of state of each member nation, meets two 
or three times a year. It has a six month rotating presidency, and 
while it is a meeting for the heads of state, it is generally a meeting 
of the Prime Ministers of each nation, except France which does send its 
president (Leonard 38). The procedure in these meetings is much less 
formal than in the other meetings, and often helps the leaders to 
accomplish things that ordinarily would not be accomplished. The 
European Council is often instrumental in breaking deadlocks in other 
institutions such as the Council of Ministers. It gained legal 
recognition in the Single European Act (SEA), but its powers remain 
largely undefined. 
Enlargement of the Community 
Soon after the creation of the EC, Britain again applied for EC 
membership. In 1970, along with Ireland, Denmark, and Norway, the UK 
was again considered for membership. The negotiations with Britain were 
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again difficult, but not as troublesome as before. Charles de Gaulle 
was no longer President of France, and France was much less opposed to 
British membership than before. However, Britain wanted many special 
considerations because of its relations with its colonies. The others 
were not as unruly as Britain. Eventually, all four of the applications 
were accepted by the existing EC members, but the Norwegian people 
narrowly rejected membership and Norway withdrew its application. 
There have been two enlargements since this time. Greece joined in 
1981 and Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. The 1986 enlargement was 
the last to date, but with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, 
further enlargements may indeed take place. The fall of communism may 
increase the responsibilities of the EC. With many of its European 
neighbors suffering from the effects of years of mismanagement, the EC 
may be called in to help establish free markets and democratic 
governments, and also to aid the hungry and unemployed people while the 
transition takes place. Such actions would place the European Community 
in a prominent place not only in Western Europe but in Eastern Europe as 
wel 1. 
The Single European Act (SEA) 
The next step on the path to European integration occurred in 1987. 
The Single European Act (SEA) amended the Treaty of Rome and was the 
first such major amendment since the Treaty was signed in 1957. The SEA 
strives to create "an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, services, and capital is ensured" (Moravcsik 41). 
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These goals sound remarkably similar to the ones set out in the Treaty 
of Rome thirty years prior. The SEA was intended to finally implement 
the Treaty of Rome and to create a single, "common" market by 1992. 
These moves were to produce a five percent gain in the EC's Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), a six percent cut in consumer prices, and make 
public procurement cheaper and more efficient (Hackett 85). 
One of the main areas the SEA dealt with was barriers, both 
physical and technical. Physical barriers are those such as border 
crossings and international airports. The SEA proposes to eliminate 
national customs inspections in favor of Community wide rules that all 
nations will follow. People who fly into France would be subject to the 
same sorts of searches and fees as those flying into Greece. Border 
controls are another difficult problem the SEA tried to examine. The 
removal of these controls are important to the goals of free movement of 
capital and people. It is much more difficult when everyone has to be 
stopped at each border when they maybe be passing only from Portugal to 
Spain. 
Technical barriers are more troublesome to deal with. These 
problems would require that all EC nations harmonize their standards on 
everything from meat to the safety of children's toys. This is a 
monumental undertaking for an entity the size of the European Community. 
Twelve different nations would have to agree upon all standards. Fiscal 
cooperation is another arduous task. Nearly all twelve members have 
different banking laws. The SEA would allow a person or business to 
bank in any EC bank in any EC country provided that they meet the 
standards and requirements of any one country in the EC. The SEA also 
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proposes standardization of the Value Added Tax (VAT), which was first 
instituted in 1967. Each nation would have the same VAT on items, where 
before an item may have had a 33 percent VAT in Germany, while the same 
item in Ireland may have been taxed at only 13 percent. This 
standardization will be a difficult task for the EC. Labor laws are yet 
an additional trying area. This would entail establishing certain 
Community wide standards for the training of professional people such as 
doctors and lawyers. Public procurement is a third area for the SEA. 
This aspect of the treaty would seek to streamline government functions 
and make buying items the governments need quicker, easier, and cheaper. 
The powers of the EC institutions were also increased. The SEA 
leaves nearly all the powers of implementation to the Commission. The 
Council of Ministers' powers have been increased several times 
throughout the years and it remains the most powerful of the EC 
institutions. The institution which benefitted the most from the SEA 
was the European Parliament (EP). Though still probably the least 
powerful of the EC institutions, with the SEA it gained the right to 
make changes on Council proposals and may reject the Council's 
decisions, requiring the Council to take a second reading of the matter 
(Harrop 37). The increase of power to these institutions, including the 
legal recognition of the European Council, makes the European Community 
more of a supranational entity than ever. 
The Maastricht Treaty 
The last step to date in the creation of the European Community is 
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the Maastricht Treaty. It was developed in Maastricht, the Netherlands 
in December 1991. It was a difficult negotiation, with Denmark 
initially rejecting the treaty but later accepting it. Again, the goals 
of this treaty are very much the same as those of the Treaty of Rome and 
the Single European Act before it. 
Maastricht has several key provisions. One of the major points 
concerns the creation of a common currency to be instituted in the EC by 
January 1, 1999. It is tied to a series of other economic measures, 
such as the establishment of the European Central Bank and certain 
preconditions that member nations must meet before being allowed to join 
the new currency. These include certain standards for inflation rates, 
interest rates, deficits, and government debts ("How to Get" 52). The 
monetary union has been one of the more controversial aspects of the 
treaty. The UK chose to "opt out" of the monetary union altogether and 
was allowed to do so mainly so Maastricht would be passed. 
A second area that Maastricht deals with is the establishment of a 
common foreign policy for all EC members. Any decision on a major 
policy requires a unanimous vote, but some decisions can be made on the 
basis of a qualified majority. This proposal has generated arguments as 
well. Many nations do not wish to sacrifice the autonomy and 
sovereignty that such an agreement requires. 
Defense policy is also a part of Maastricht. Maastricht revived 
the long-standing but largely inactive Western European Union (WEU). 
Nine countries are currently members of the WEU, which serves as a link 
between the EC and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 
revival of the WEU may also be a reaction to the anticipated withdrawal 
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of United States troops. 
Social policy was also discussed at Maastricht. Again, Britain did 
not agree and again opted out of the agreement. The remaining eleven 
members agreed to use EC institutions to aid other members governments 
in the areas of workers' health and safety, sexual equality in the 
workplace, and providing information and consultation to workers. These 
measures will become national law in each member state's government, but 
will not become EC law due to Britain's refusal to accept it. 
The Maastricht Treaty also granted the EC increased powers over 
certain issues. These areas include policies toward the environment, 
research and development, energy, consumer protection, health, 
education, training, and culture. Maastricht also created the concept 
of an EC citizenship. Citizens of one EC nation living in another EC 
nation would be allowed to vote not only in EC elections, but local 
elections as well. Free movement of persons from nation to nation 
within the EC will finally be achieved. Britain does not plan to 
participate in this aspect, as the British intend to keep their border 
controls intact. 
The poorer nations of the EC won a small victory at Maastricht. 
The four poorest nations — Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece — will 
be the recipients of the newly created Cohesion Fund. Its main purpose 
is to boost investment in the areas of the environment and transport 
systems in an effort to bring them up to speed with the rest of Europe. 
The increased spending will continue until the per capita income of 
these nations reaches 90 percent of the EC average ("Deal" 52). 
Again, the powers of the EC institutions were affected. The 
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European Parliament was given power over the areas of consumer 
protection, health, education, trans-European networks, culture, 
environment, research and the single market. The EP also gains the 
right to veto laws concerning any of these areas. The European 
Commission's membership was cut from 17 members to 12, one from each 
nat i on. 
Maastricht has just recently been ratified, and no time has been 
set for its implementation. The treaty's ratification has been a long 
and trying process, leaving many to wonder if Europe really had the will 
to unite. Nationalism has played a large role in defining Europe's 
will. Some member nations simply do not wish to trade their sovereignty 
and national identity for new ones that are part of a yet to be defined 
character and nature. As these nationalistic feelings are soothed, 
Europe's will to unite will strengthen and the world's doubts will 
subside. 
But whatever the doubts, the realization is that the treaty passed 
and will soon be put into place. This treaty also causes many to 
speculate about the future of the European Community. Just what sort of 
political or economic body will it be? Negotiations with member nations 
may prove to be even more difficult than they previously were, because 
instead of dealing with only one nation, the negotiator finds himself 
dealing with a bloc of nations. Furthermore, one nation's stance may or 
may not be representative of the whole Community's view on a situation. 
What will happen to this dream of a united Europe remains to be seen. 
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Conclusion 
The road to the EC the world now knows has not always been a 
pleasant one. But nonetheless, the EC has arrived and is a force to be 
reckoned with. Tracing the evolution of the Community from its 
inception to its current actions is important to a study such as this 
for many reasons. It provides an important historical background which 
provides the context in which the focus of this study, the Council of 
Ministers, operates. If the EC is to survive, it needs governing bodies 
such as the Council of Ministers to guide it in making the appropriate 
policies and decisions. If the Council is to survive, it will have to 
help the EC make the feasible political decisions. Institutions of the 
EC must all interact in order to function as they were designed. 
Although the Council is the most powerful institution, all the 
institutions are important in their own ways. 
Chapter Three 
The Council of Ministers 
The Council of Ministers is considered to be the center of power of 
the European Community. It does share some power with the Commission, 
but the Council remains the more powerful of the two. As previously 
discussed, the Council has its origins in the Treaty of Rome. Articles 
145-154 in the Treaty actually establish the Council and assign it its 
specific duties. The Council is to "ensure the coordination of the 
general economic policies of the member states and dispose a power of 
decision" (Treaty 127). The function of the Council of Ministers is to 
make decisions, pass laws, and coordinate the economic policies of the 
member nations. There is one restriction upon its freedom to rule. It 
cannot act upon any proposal not initiated by the Commission. 
While the Council of Ministers is most often thought to be a single 
Council, it is really made up of several specific Councils. The Foreign 
Ministers' Council meets every month but August (the Council members 
vacation in August) and is also known as the General Affairs Council. 
It deals mainly with external issues of the Community and prepares the 
meetings of the European Council. The Council of Agriculture is another 
important group. It makes decisions on the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). This Council meets every month, but may meet more often in the 
earlier months of the year when prices for agricultural products must be 
decided (Butler 25). There are several other Councils as well, such as 
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Finance, Budget, Development, Research, Energy, Environment, and Social 
Affairs to name a few. It is in these meetings that the real business 
of the European Community is done. 
The Presidency 
The presidency of the Council is an extremely important role. The 
president's actions can set the tone for the entire term. He also can 
affect the terms of the leaders of the other EC institutions. The 
Council has a six month rotating presidency, taken by each nation 
alphabetically by the spelling of the nation in its own language. The 
current rotation is Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United 
Kingdom. The president convenes meetings of the Council and guides 
those meetings. He also organizes any meetings of the European Council 
and the follow-up to any decisions taken by the European Council. He is 
in charge of coordinating all Council meetings and of the parties 
attached to it. The workload of the presidency is sometimes tremendous, 
especially for a president from a small nation, like Ireland. These 
Ministers are used to working with significantly fewer people, and are 
also unaccustomed to the frequency and duration of Council meetings. 
During the first six months of the Irish presidency in 1975, Irish 
ministers chaired twenty-seven meetings of the Council and provided the 
chair for some 190 Council committees and working groups (Barrington and 
Cooney 36). And amazingly enough, the number has risen from there. 
When Ireland chaired the Council in 1990, there were forty-two Council 
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meetings alone, not including the various other meetings held by 
different committees (Bui let in 1990). Member states always want to have 
an effective presidency, but often this goal is stymied by long-standing 
national rivalries that simply cannot be solved in one six month period. 
The president has several roles that he must fill, according to 
Helen Wallace. First, he must be the management of the Council. The 
basic tasks of scheduling meetings and other administrative duties must 
be carried out correctly and promptly if the presidency is to be a 
success. His second duty is to promote political initiatives. If the 
Community is to grow and prosper, political unification, at least on 
some level, will have to occur. The President must also be what Wallace 
terms a "package broker". He must be a salesman of sorts. The 
president must facilitate agreement on the issues at hand and it is his 
responsibility to do so. The president is the liaison between the 
Council and the other European Community institutions. If he is not a 
good "package broker" or is not in control managerially speaking, his 
impression on the other leaders will be less than favorable. His 
impression could well affect future negotiations between the 
institutions. Finally, he has the role of spokesman, both for the 
Council and the EC as a whole. Again, a pleasant impact upon the 
persons with whom he is dealing is ever so important. His actions could 
make or break the Community in the sight of his fellow Europeans and in 
the sight of the world. 
For any nation, the presidency can be trying, but it is even more 
difficult for the smaller member states to execute an effective 
presidency. Very often they carry little weight politically and 
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economically, and do not carry the clout that a member state such as the 
United Kingdom or France has. They are also often not used to being 
put in the spotlight , so to speak. It can be a great opportunity for 
the smaller states to use the position to help themselves, but often 
this is impossible due to the nature of the presidency. 
Voting 
Voting in the Council of Ministers is done on a qualified majority 
basis. The votes are based roughly upon the size of the nation in 
question. Currently the voting is arranged in this manner: 
— Germany, France, United Kingdom, and Italy have ten votes each 
— Spain has eight votes 
— Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal have five votes 
each 
— Denmark and Ireland have three votes each 
— Luxembourg has two votes. 
The votes add up to a total of seventy-six. Fifty-four are needed for a 
proposal to be passed, which means twenty-three votes can block an 
action. Therefore, three of the larger nations acting together, or two 
large nations and one small one (except Luxembourg) can block a 
proposal. Five of the smaller states could also band together to defeat 
a proposal (Leonard 36). Many have argued that this qualified voting 
system needs to be restructured, so that the distribution of votes is 
more equitable. The smaller nations are extremely over-represented in 
the present system. There is also the danger of a divided European 
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Commumty on the basis of the vote assignment. The votes of the 
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, and Greece) total twenty-three, 
enough to successfully block a measure. In northern Europe, the UK and 
Germany along with one smaller country can also garner enough votes to 
block a measure. The northern states tend to be richer than the poor 
southern states, and the poorer nations could pay for their blocks by 
having resources such as the Cohesion Fund sharply diminished by the 
northern European nations (Harrop 28). 
There are three voting procedures for majority voting. The first 
is a qualified majority when the Council acts upon a proposal from the 
Commission. The most important areas listed in the Treaty of Rome which 
require a qualified vote are discrimination regarding services, freedom 
of capital movement, and the operation of the common agricultural, 
transport, and commercial policies (Barrington and Cooney 37). The 
second procedure is when a vote is taken on an act not based on a 
Commission proposal. The Council may ask the Commission that action 
be taken on a specific issue. The Commission may choose to submit 
legislation on the issue, but the legislation is not based on the 
Commission's proposal; it is based on the Council's request for action. 
In this situation, the same number of minimum votes, fifty-four, are 
still required but these votes must represent the votes of at least six 
member states. The last form is the least common. Simple majority 
voting is used when the vote does not concern any of the areas 
previously mentioned, and requires the assent of six member nations, 
regardless of their qualified number of votes. 
There are cases when unanimous votes are necessary. When the 
Council wishes to change or amend a proposal from the Commission, a 
unanimous vote must be taken. The vote is used as a check on the 
Council's power. This ensures that the Commission's interests are not 
overridden by those of the Council. 
The Treaty of Rome intended for majority voting to extend to other 
areas. However, the French boycott of all European institutions in 1965 
ended the intended expansion, and the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise was 
adopted. The compromise stated that unanimous voting would be used 
where a vital interest of a member state was under consideration. This 
action greatly hampered the decision-making process but guaranteed the 
safety of a nation's national interests. The only problem with this is 
that virtually any area can be considered a vital interest for any 
nation at any time. 
Composition of the Council 
The Council of Ministers is made up of representatives from each 
member state. These ministers are generally accompanied in the Council 
meetings by other government officials and often junior ministers, as 
well as members of the Commission who regularly sit in on Council 
meetings. In addition to the president of the Council, the Council also 
has a Secretariat which has desk officers to watch over policy 
developments in different areas. A majority of the staff are either 
lawyers or translators (Henig 13). There are a number of Councils that 
meet on special topics, such as agriculture, monetary policy, health, 
education, and so forth. When these meetings are held, the minister 
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from each nation that is responsible for that area attends that meeting. 
For example, all the Ministers of Agriculture from the twelve member 
nations attend the Council meeting on agriculture. The meeting of the 
Foreign Ministers is generally regarded as the most powerful of the 
specific Councils, although the Agriculture Council is close behind. 
The Council also has a corps of bureaucrats working for it known as 
COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives. These officials 
help the Council prepare for their meetings and also help to deal with 
routine business. COREPER is made up of one senior official, usually 
having ambassadorial rank, from each member state. Each representative 
has a staff to help him deal with the wide range of topics with which he 
must deal and also to help regulate the flow of work. With the 
increased complexity of the European Community, more paperwork and other 
such duties are flooding the Council. COREPER has a wide range of 
committees under it which also help in handling the vast amount of work 
that must be done. COREPER is also responsible for a number of other 
areas. It must prepare Council directives for submission to the 
Commission dealing with tariff and trade negotiations. COREPER is also 
responsible for writing general directives for the meetings of the 
associate Councils and preparing the various amendments to directives 
that may be needed. Officials of COREPER also conduct meetings between 
the European Community and Latin America. COREPER has been responsible 
for some talks with countries seeking to join the European Community. 
In recent years, it has become a forum for discussion for nominations of 
persons to the Commission and also debate concerning the choice of the 
Commission's President (Pryce 69). 
Council Meetings 
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Council meetings are held quite frequently, sometimes meeting as 
repeatedly as sixteen times a month (Builetin 1990). The Council 
meetings themselves are rather formal, and often the real deals are 
struck in less formal settings, such as over lunch or dinner. The 
meetings are held in Brussels and in the capital of the nation holding 
the Presidency once or twice each six month term. Meetings are also 
held at the United Nations' General Assembly and at other international 
meetings throughout the year. 
In his book, Europe: More Than A Continent. Michael Butler 
chronicles what takes place in a typical Foreign Ministers' Council 
meeting. It is important to examine the contents of an actual meeting 
for several reasons. First, one must understand how the meetings run in 
order to get a feel for the functions of the Council. In this 
particular example, there were no interactions with the other governing 
institutions of the EC, but one must know how the Council runs itself in 
order to understand how the institutions work together. Also, if one is 
to do a critical analysis of the Council, it is quite useful to know the 
procedure for Council meetings so that problems may be identified and 
solved within the established framework of the institution. Finally, 
one gets a deeper understanding of the complexity of the European 
Community when examining the contents of one meeting and multiplying it 
by the many times a month a Council may meet. 
At the Council meetings, Butler says, the atmosphere is fairly 
formal, but it is relaxed by the fact that most of the Ministers have 
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worked together before, often for many years. "There is a genuine 
feeling of a Foreign Ministers' club" (Butler 73). Even though the 
meetings are friendly and the people familiar, it is often not easy to 
accomplish the goals set for the meeting. The meetings are attended by 
a number of people the President and his advisors, members of the 
Commission and COREPER and other Community officials including 
translators. Before the meeting, the Permanent Representatives will 
brief the Minister on the agenda for the meeting and give him any 
information that is vital to the discussion. These meetings go on in 
the morning and after the Ministers go to lunch, the Council meeting 
begins. The first item of business is to adopt the agenda which may 
have anywhere from six to twelve items on it, items as diverse as the 
tariff on televisions from Japan to the preparations for the next 
European Council meeting to Ireland and Spain's share of the Regional 
Fund (Butler 77). The Council will then look at the resolutions passed 
by the European Parliament at its last meeting. The president, who 
chairs the meeting, points out the significant points and occasionally a 
discussion will ensue. The role of the president is very important in 
these meetings. If he does not have a clear agenda and a plan for 
achieving this agenda, the meeting will go nowhere. The points 
discussed will either go to COREPER for further work or be voted upon. 
This procedure is followed for all points. Some ministers, Butler says, 
do not sit all the time. They may choose to allow a junior minister to 
sit on meetings not of vital importance to their own nation. If the 
issues being dealt with are particularly troublesome, the meeting may 
stretch on into the night or even into the next day. If it is apparent 
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that no decision can be reached, the president may choose to send it 
back to COREPER for further work and will present the issue again at the 
next meeting. 
The Role of the Council in the EC 
In order to grasp the importance of the Council in the European 
Community, it is necessary to examine the decision-making process of the 
Community. The "general rule is that the Commission proposes, the 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee advise, the Council 
disposes, and the Commission comes in again to implement any decisions 
that may be taken" (Kerr 70). The first step in this process is that 
someone, such as a Council or Commission member or a member state, asks 
that action be taken on a particular subject. The creation of the 
Regional Policy happened in just that way. It was called for at a 
meeting of the European Council in 1973 (Butler 87). 
The second phase in the journey to law is the Commission. A few 
members get together to write a draft. This is often more difficult 
than it sounds because the members may speak different languages and the 
services of interpreters have to be engaged. It is then sent to a study 
group which is made up of national civil servants and other experts, 
with a Commission official as the chair. How many of these study groups 
are involved depends upon how complex the issue is. This stage may last 
anywhere from three months to several years, depending upon how detailed 
the draft proposal is and how often the experts are able to meet. A 
final draft is then taken to each commissioner for his approval. When 
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the draft is accepted by all members of the Commission, it moves into 
the next phase. 
While the next step does send the proposal to the Council, it does 
not go directly except in cases of great emergency. It first goes to 
the Council Secretariat and is distributed to the member states through 
It is also sent to the Parliament and occasionally to the 
Economic and Social Committee for their opinions. The governments 
examine the proposal and make the comments through their representatives 
on whichever working group is dealing with the issue. 
Meanwhile, the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee are 
putting together their opinions. These opinions are not binding, but 
they are often taken into consideration when the final decision is made. 
In both cases, the proposal is sent to whichever committee deals with 
that subject. After discussion here, the proposal and its corresponding 
opinion is brought to the floor for a vote. 
The real decision often takes place in COREPER. If a proposal is 
not well-received in COREPER, it most likely won't be well-received by 
the Ministers, and the Commission will withdraw the proposal. 
There are three acts from which the Council may choose. A 
"directive" sets out a goal to be achieved, like that of standardized 
policies concerning the quality of meat. The member states then have to 
enact legislation nationally for the directive to be implemented. A 
"regulation" becomes law throughout the EC as soon as it is published in 
the Official Journal. The member states have to apply it through their 
own governments but sometimes this does not happen. A "decision" 
settles a particular issue, particularly if it is one of a pressing 
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nature. When this route is taken, the Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee are not involved. 
The same procedure is taken when countries apply for admission to 
the EC. The application is sent to the Council first, but the 
Commission is expected to give an opinion on the country's suitability 
for membership in the European Community. The Commission then holds 
talks with the prospective member and gives its opinion to the Council, 
which is not bound by the opinion but generally abides by it. The 
decision to admit has to be unanimous and can only take effect when 
ratified by all the parliaments of the existing member states. 
The relationship between the Commission and the Council is a close 
one. The Council may enact 500 directives, regulations, and decisions 
within a year, while the Commission may pass over 3000, but many of 
these are concerning price setting for agriculture (Kerr 75). The 
Commission also is responsible for the Customs Union and the Common 
Agricultural Policy. If decisions about these topics cannot be made 
within the Commission, the issue comes before the Council. 
Emergencies do arise, and in this case, the issue goes to both the 
Council and the Commission simultaneously. The Council has several 
options in this situation. It may approve the emergency measure, or it 
may exempt the member state from the Community law governing that area. 
The nation that brought the action may withdraw the request, but the 
Council may take other steps to ease the crisis. The request may be 
ruled in violation of EC law and if the nation does not withdraw it, the 
matter may be taken by the Commission or the Council to the European 
Court of Justice. This happens very rarely because most member states 
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are willing to work within the frameworks of the Council and the 
Commission without involving the Court. Court proceedings are often 
lengthy and most nations would rather settle the issues in the most 
timely manner possible. 
From this description of the decision-making process, the large and 
important role the Council plays is evident. Virtually no decisions can 
be made without the Council's approval. The input and the opinions of 
the other institutions are helpful and important also, but not to the 
extent of the weight of the Council's decisions. The decision-making 
process is a long and intricate one with nearly all institutions 
involved at some point or another. The Commission has often claimed 
that the Council has too much power, and the Parliament claims that both 
the Council and the Commission have too much power. This is usually 
chalked up to institutional rivalry. The Council inherited the 
politically dominant role of the ECSC's High Authority when the three 
Communities merged, and the Commission's power has declined in recent 
years. The Parliament is still the least powerful of the three but 
gained somewhat more influence in the Maastricht Treaty. 
The role of the Council in the European Community cannot be 
underestimated as well. It plays the very important role of liaison 
between the member states and the European Community, and sometimes 
between the EC and other nations. In 1988, the Council voted to ban all 
beef containing hormones from being sold in the Community. Since 
approximately fifty-six percent of the cattle raised in the US are fed 
hormones, this was a serious declaration (Riley A7). The US threatened 
tariffs on some European goods such as Italian wine and German fruit 
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juice. The US planned to increase the tariffs on these items by one 
hundred percent. The severity of this situation shows the power that 
the Council holds. Their decision on hormone-fed beef could have 
sparked an international trade war. The Council is also important in 
Community affairs because of its many interactions with the other 
Community institutions. Positive relations help the Community achieve 
its goal of a united Europe; negative, difficult ones hamper and impair 
progress. The very existence of the Community depends upon the Council. 
The Council in many ways is largely responsible for the continued 
integration of the Community. Without its decisions on Community 
issues, the EC would be stalled. It is indeed the major center of power 
in the European Community. This does not mean, however, that the 
Council is without its shortcomings. 
Chapter Four 
Problems of the Council of Ministers 
The Council of Ministers as a rule operates and functions as it was 
designed to do. When an institution is designed, the possible defects 
within the system are hard to recognize. But they are even more 
difficult to correct once the system has been instituted. This does 
not mean that nothing can be done. It simply becomes more of a 
challenge when an organization has already been established. Despite 
the best intentions of those who developed the institutions of the 
Community, there are still problems within it. 
One of the problems with the Council of Ministers is the extreme 
number of meetings and the workload involved. The Council itself meets 
for approximately 100 days a year and COREPER meets for about 100 more 
(Henig 29). These meetings are in addition to the duties of the 
Ministers in their national governments. This may be an attempt by the 
Council to ensure their permanence as an EC institution. By meeting 
nearly constantly, their work becomes indispensable, and therefore the 
existence of the Council is guaranteed. The number of meetings 
increases with every year. In ten years, the job of serving on the 
Council of Ministers may well be a full-time position. The Ministers do 
have the aid of COREPER to help them prepare positions and prepare for 
meetings, but it is difficult to know everything about every subject. 
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COREPER is the organization with the information, and while this is 
their job, there could also be some additional problems involved. If a 
Minister is not truly aware of a particular situation, he may simply 
listen to the advice of a COREPER representative. The representative 
may have designs of his own and lead the Minister astray with wrong, 
uninformed, or biased opinions. The COREPER representative may have 
strong national loyalties and lead the Minister down a path that would 
be best for the representative's country, but not for the Community as a 
whole. 
Workload 
As a result of the large amount of work in the Council, the 
Minister's performance at home may suffer. A less than stellar 
performance at home may have a tremendous effect upon the Community and 
the Council. If a government is not productive and successful at home, 
the government may fall. A new government may be installed, changing 
many positions in all of the Community institutions, including the 
Council of Ministers. The Council could be in the middle of an 
important negotiation, for example a negotiation concerning agricultural 
prices. The government of France falls, and a new Minister of 
Agriculture is seated. While the previous Minister was in favor of 
price supports to help poor farmers in Ireland, the new Minister is not. 
The negotiations break off and the farmers of Ireland do not get their 
price supports. The decision could have grave effects not only upon 
Ireland but upon the Coawnunity as well. The effects on Ireland are 
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obvious — the poor farmers get poorer. For the Community, the poor 
fanners suddenly become a tremendous burden on the welfare system and 
end up costing the Community more than if the price supports proposal 
had been passed. 
If the topic is particularly troublesome, the meeting may become 
lengthy. These long meetings can make negotiations difficult because of 
exhaustion and frustration. Ministers may often agree to proposals that 
during the light of day would never have been agreed upon, simply to end 
the meeting. This may not be good policy-making, but it allows the 
meeting to end. 
Complexity of Council 
The very structure of the Council is often a problem in trying to 
accomplish goals. There are so many different Councils that are 
considering so many different topics. Because of the complexity of 
topics faced by the Council, this is a necessary evil so that something 
can be accomplished in a timely fashion. Yet it is the number of these 
Councils that make it so difficult to achieve goals. Coordination of 
these Councils' meetings is a scheduling nightmare. Meetings must not 
conflict with other scheduled events, either in the Community, the 
Minister's home nation, or on the international scene. As previously 
mentioned, some issues fall into the domain of one or more Councils. 
Joint meetings are sometimes scheduled, and this throws together groups 
of people who have never worked together before. Cooperation among 
strangers is difficult. It can be made even more difficult if 
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personality and political differences arise, as can happen in meetings 
such as this. 
The representatives of COREPER have provided invaluable help to 
members of the various Councils, but their presence adds to the 
complexity of the Council. COREPER is one more channel through which 
paperwork must flow, but COREPER helps the Ministers to execute their 
jobs in a more productive manner. Nonetheless, the endless meetings, 
research, briefings, and such that must constantly go on if the Council 
is to function make it a very enigmatic institution. 
The Council also has a Secretariat which oversees various duties. 
While these officers are very necessary to the proper operation of the 
Council, their involvement makes trying to deal with the Council nothing 
less than a ordeal. Where does one take a particular piece of 
information? Does it go to COREPER and then to the Minister? Or does it 
go to the Secretariat, who will then see to whom it should be passed? 
Or should it go to the Minister directly, if one can get to him 
directly? If it should go to the Minister directly, to which Minister 
should it go? This is but another example of the intricacies of the 
Council of Ministers. 
The complexity of the Council itself is caused mainly by the 
bureaucratic structure of the Council. The structure is intended to 
help the Minister perform his duties, but in many cases slows the 
performance of the tasks. An important piece of information may get 
sent to the wrong organ of the bureaucracy and sit there for weeks 
before the mistake is realized. Meanwhile, the Council has made a 
decision that would have been drastically affected by the revelation of 
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this new fact. Most often it is difficult to reverse decisions. Even 
if the decision can be withdrawn, much precious time has been lost, and 
if the decision were concerning a "high politics" area such as foreign 
policy or finance, the results could be disastrous. 
Some of the complexity of the Council cannot be helped. It is 
simply a part of politics in the modern era. However, this ballooning 
bureaucracy is unquestionably a major cause of the confusion of the 
Council. The overwhelming intricacy of the Council, although some is 
unavoidable, is a hindrance to the leadership the Council is supposed to 
provide. 
Complexity of Decision-making Process 
A related area of concern for the Council of Ministers is the 
decision-making process. A tremendous number of people are involved in 
this process. First the Commission is involved. Then the proposal goes 
to the Council, and also to the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee for advisory opinions. The Council makes a decision 
and the Commission is sometimes involved again to implement the 
decision. The process is necessary to prevent any one institution from 
becoming too powerful, but at some point one must realize the number of 
people involved. There are twelve Commissioners, twelve Ministers, 518 
Parliamentarians, and 189 people on the Economic and Social Committee 
(Leonard 40, 45). Combined, that means that a total of 731 people are 
involved in each decision, and the number rises by 19 if the Court of 
Justice becomes involved. This number also does not include the 
multitude of officers, OOREPER representatives, translators, experts, 
junior Ministers, and various and sundry others who at one time or 
another become involved in the process. After all of these people have 
dealt with the issue, it must then go to the twelve national governments 
for ratification and implementation. Each national governments' 
bureaucracy becomes involved in the decision, and there is virtually no 
way of telling what the final involvement count really is. Again, the 
complexity becomes an issue of bureaucracy. Some of these people are 
genuinely necessary and important, such as translators, but others could 
probably be left out of the loop with no irreparable harm done. This is 
the world of modern politics. No one wants someone else to become too 
powerful, and so a ridiculous number of checks and balances are 
instituted. What results is a situation like the Community faces, where 
over 731 people are involved at any one time over any one decision. 
A large portion of the complexity of the decision-making process is 
a result of putting checks on the powers of the Council. What results 
is extremely slow decision-making. Anthony Kerr illustrates this point 
by a comparison to national governments' decision-making processes. 
There is no automatic majority as there normally has been in 
the British Parliament and often in the French National 
Assembly. When the Commission presents a proposal to the 
Council it is by no means certain of getting it through, and 
fully expects important amendments to be made. If a United 
Kingdom Bill is rejected, or if it is substantially amended 
against the Cabinet's wishes, the Prime Minister normally has 
to resign or call an election, and as MPs on the government 
side are reluctant to face an election, especially when the 
Government are unpopular, they usually let the Bill through 
even if they do not like it. But the Commission does not 
reside in a similar situation, and the Council cannot be 
dissolved: both have to soldier on. Individual Commissioners 
do resign, however, not because they have to, but because they 
find the process too frustrating (Kerr 76-77). 
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This type of frustration is experienced by many in the Community 
institutions. The slow process hurts all involved, and the people the 
proposal affects as well. By the time a proposal is passed on hunger 
relief, it may be too late. The slow, complex decision-making process 
is one of the greatest faults of the European Community institutions. 
It was meant to keep the power of the Council in check, but what it 
really does is tie the hands of the Council so that nothing can be 
achieved without a long, involved process. 
Internal Contradictions in Member Nations 
The vast number of Councils and meetings that take place make it 
difficult to coordinate schedules and positions on certain issues. It 
is quite possible for a member nation to take two opposing stands on an 
issue because of the lack of coordination between Ministers from the 
same state. As previously pointed out, some issues require attention 
from more than one Council. If it is a particularly complicated area, 
it is quite easy for wires to get crossed, and for Ministers from the 
same nation to espouse quite different views. Confusion may also happen 
on very routine issues. Using the previous example of hormone—laced 
beef, the Minister on the Health Council may believe that limiting or 
banning the sale of hormone-laced beef is the proper and healthy thing 
to do. The Foreign Minister may not think so because of the effect that 
such actions could have on external relations with nations like the US. 
The Agriculture Minister may realize that it will help some of his 
farmers because of the lessened amount of imported meat allowed in the 
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Community, but may hurt some of his nation's farmers because they too 
use hormones when raising their beef. The Agriculture Minister may not 
know which stance to choose. Assume all these Ministers are from the 
same member state. If the various Ministers involved do not consult 
each other, the same nation will have three conflicting stances on the 
same issue. This sort of miscommunication not only hinders Community 
progress, but it can also be embarrassing for the member state involved. 
The problem of miscommunication is probably not one that enters the 
minds of most Ministers, which is precisely why it occurs. Consultation 
with other Ministers from the same member state would generally not take 
a tremendous amount of time. Any differences could be discussed at 
these meetings. The meetings could take time depending upon how many 
differences existed, but discussing these differences before the Council 
convenes would be time well spent. 
There is also another possible problem. Each Minister is 
responsible for operating in the best interest of his particular area. 
When Ministers of the same national government take opposing stands on 
an issue, it could be due to the fact that the decision is in the best 
interest of one area, but not of another. Such political complexity 
makes completing Community business even more complicated. 
Qualified Voting 
The larger countries of the European Community have more votes in 
the Council than those of the smaller nations, but these nations also 
have larger populations. Therefore, they are more largely affected by 
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decisions made by the Community. However, the smaller nations need to 
gather only twenty-three of a possible seventy-six votes to block a 
decision. This means that the largest five (Britain, Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain), which represent two-thirds of the population of the EC 
cannot outvote the smaller seven. To reach the required fifty-four 
votes, the big five need the support of at least two of the smaller 
states; smaller nations seeking backing need to get three large nations 
on their side. The basic premise is that the fifty-four votes will 
represent approximately seventy percent of the EC population. 
So far this set-up has worked nicely. However, when future 
applications for membership are considered, the situation will change. 
Of the possible nations to apply for EC membership, only two — Poland 
and Turkey — have populations large enough to join the big five in 
number of votes. The possible inclusion of Norway (three votes), 
Austria (four or five votes), Sweden (four or five votes) and Finland 
(three votes) will permit eight nations representing only twelve percent 
of the EC population to block the decisions of eight nations 
representing eighty-eight percent ("The Maths" 51). 
This possibility has started talks among the nations about a 
restructuring of qualified voting in the Council. It could already be 
argued that the larger nations are under-represented and the smaller 
ones over-represented. Germany has a population of around eighty 
million after unification which is about twenty-two million more than 
the next nation on the list, Britain with fifty-eight million ("The 
Maths" 51). Luxembourg has four hundred thousand residents. Based on 
the fact that Luxembourg has two votes, this would mean that Germany 
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should have four hundred votes. Such inequalities in voting will only 
become larger when new members are allowed to join. 
The Cult of Personality 
A simple fact of life is that some people are more charismatic than 
others. These gifted people can get more done than most others can. 
Many politicians are this way, and some more so than others. This is 
true in the Council as well. Some Ministers are more confident than 
others. Some have been Ministers longer than others. While the fact 
that some people have better personalities than others does not really 
constitute a problem, it can make accomplishing things more difficult 
for those who do not. 
Politics often plays a greater role in situations such as these 
than does personality. Certain nations carry greater clout than do 
others. France is more politically powerful than Portugal. Getting 
things done is easier for a Minister from Germany than it is for a 
Minister from Greece. Economic power has a similar function to that of 
political power. A nation such as Germany has tremendous power due to 
the fact that the European Monetary System (EMS) is based upon the 
German deutsche mark. Therefore, whatever is good for the German 
deutsche-mark be good for the EC economy as a whole. 
There will always be nations that are more powerful than others in 
any given situation. The larger nations may have more political power 
in some cases than do the smaller ones. However, these political 
inequalities are more than evened out when the power the qualified 
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majority voting system gives the smaller nations is considered. 
Inefficiency 
With the vast number of people involved in the decision-making 
process and the large number of proposal that are made every year, a 
claim of inefficiency against the Council is an obvious one. In most 
cases, this is a true accusation. Wolfgang Wessels states that the 
amount of time taken between all the institutions is in proportion to 
the amount of time taken in a bicameral national government system 
(Wessels 149). However, the time from passage to implementation is 
atrocious. In 1989, the number of days elapsed from the first reading 
of one proposal from the Commission to its adoption by the Council was 
507 days, well over a year (Wessels 143). Inefficiency is reigning 
supreme. 
The number of people involved in these decisions has been discussed 
previously, and with 731 people to be involved on a single decision, 
inefficiency rules here as well. The Council cannot function 
efficiently with the current system in place. The Community will be 
the one that suffers in the long run — from increased expenses, 
frustrated members, burned out Ministers, indecision, and missed 
opportunities. 
Implementation 
As one may well imagine, implementation of the proposals when they 
53 
are finally passed is not an easy task either. There are twelve 
different systems of government, with nearly that many styles of 
government, and probably more than twelve ways to implement a decision. 
Implementation is technically the responsibility of the Commission, but 
in reality it is left up to the member governments to implement new 
measures. 
Implementation does not always take place. Other legislation may 
become more important. The state may not agree with the legislation and 
simply choose to ignore it. The Council is setting up committees to 
deal with this problem, but this will only add to the bureaucracy and 
make Council dealings even more complex. 
While the whole process is important, the decision made is nothing 
if it is not implemented by the member governments. This slow 
implementation could also be used as another example of inefficiency. 
Council members spend large amounts of time and money developing 
proposals that in the end may not even be implemented. Such inaction is 
unexcusable. 
Again, the problem may be due in part to the large bureaucracy of 
the European Community and its institutions. Legislation has to filter 
through so many different courses that one should probably stand in 
amazement that a policy is actually implemented. Such problems will 
ultimately hinder the Community's progress toward a unified Europe. 
The "Democracy Gap" 
Another criticism of the Council is that it is not democratically 
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elected, that is, it is not seated by a direct vote of the European 
citizenry. In some cases, the Ministers are not even elected by the 
citizens of their own nation. Most of the Ministerial positions are 
appointed by the government in power. The people do vote in the ruling 
government but have no power over the government's appointments. This 
creates what is known as the "democracy gap". 
The peoples of Europe also have no recourse if they do not approve 
of the actions of the Council. They only thing that they may do is to 
bring the decision to the European Court of Justice. The Court does not 
hear every case brought to it, and even if it does hear the case, it may 
still decide in favor of the Council or whatever body the case was 
brought against. 
The only European Community institution that has direct elections 
is the European Parliament. Direct elections were instituted in 1979, 
and despite this fact, it has the least amount of power of all the 
Community institutions. The Council has the most power and the least 
accountabi1ity. 
The "democracy gap" has been a problem for most EC institutions 
since their inception, and it remains one of the severest criticisms 
against the Council and the Community. The creators of the EC must have 
felt that the checks against any one institution gaining too much power 
that were placed in the system were sufficient and that the peoples of 
Europe did not need to be a further check upon the institutions' powers. 
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Theoretical Problems 
The Council of Ministers was created to help ease the Community 
towards the path of integration. This path has been long and sometimes 
difficult, and theoretical differences have not made the path any 
easier. The Council could be termed a supranational institution. It is 
over the twelve national governments of the European Community. The 
member governments are supposed to abide by Council decisions when they 
are made. But most nations do not wish to sacrifice the national 
sovereignty and power that it takes to be governed by a supranational 
organization like the Council. This is where the conflict begins. 
The Council of Ministers is to make decisions that further the 
Community and are in the Community's best interest. Yet they are 
responsible to the governments of their home nation. If the two are in 
conflict, the national government's interest usually wins out. A 
Minister cannot be fired by the European Community for voting a certain 
way on an issue, but he can be fired by his national government for 
doing so. This sort of pressure takes away the supranational nature of 
the Council. The Council then becomes an intergovernmental institution, 
where all member governments work together but give up little national 
sovereignty or power. While the intergovernmentalist approach to 
integration has been espoused by a number of scholars, it is in a sense 
defeating the purpose of a truly unified Europe. For Europe to be truly 
unified, it would have to be under a central supranational government, 
not an intergovernmental one. 
Ministers also have to worry about accountability back home. In 
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many cases they are not allowed to make decisions that would truly 
benefit the Community because the Minister's individual government is 
opposed to it. This sort of conflict happens time and time again. It 
is the Community which suffers from these decisions, but until some sort 
of compromise is struck, it will be difficult for the Community to truly 
prosper. 
Jockeying for political position also hampers the activities of the 
Council. Each Minister wants to be able to say that it was his personal 
influence that made the proposal pass, both to gain prominence for his 
nation and also for himself. Such political manueverings may place a 
Minister in a position to receive a better Ministerial appointment from 
his nation. This sort of thought also has to be taken into 
consideration when slow decision-making and poor implementation are 
discussed. These actions may be the result of political posturing on 
the part of a Minister to gain advantage. 
The Presidency 
Performing the role of the president is difficult. Having to cope 
with political maneuvering, inefficiency, the large number of people 
involved in every decision, and other problems that have not even been 
mentioned here make the presidency very difficult to carry out. But 
without a good president, the Council is doomed to fail. Poor 
leadership on the part of the president simply compounds the problems 
from which the Council already suffers. 
The presidency is extremely difficult to execute under the 
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circumstance in which the president must operate. Many presidents feel 
fortunate that it is only a six month tenure. Still, the president 
provides the leadership for the most powerful Community institution and 
the job that he does reflects on him, his member state, and the 
Community as a whole. These problems only make it harder to execute his 
duties. 
Examples of Problems 
It is sometimes difficult to understand a problem until it is 
illustrated in a real life situation. While predicaments occur in all 
areas of the European Community, two areas seem be more problematic than 
others — the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). These are also two of the most important areas in the 
Community. This could account for the problems; the nations of the 
Community are so affected by the decisions made in these areas that they 
want to be sure that each decision is the most beneficial to the nations 
involved and to the Community. The following examples highlight the 
problems that the Council faces when dealing with European Community 
business. 
The Common Agricultural Policy 
Part of the original deal when the Community was set up was that in 
exchange for Germany's being able to export its industrial goods 
throughout the Community, France would be able to export its 
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agricultural goods under a common agricultural policy. Hence the CAP 
was established in 1963. Since that time, however, expenditures have 
grown with the enlarging of the Community to include poorer more 
agricultural states such as Ireland and Greece. The CAP is now a large 
part of the Community budget. Approximately seventy percent of the EC 
budget goes to the CAP each year (Butler 85). Another reason that the 
CAP had become so burdensome is the fact that national governments are 
so sensitive to the farmers' lobby (Butler 34). Because of the extreme 
cost of the CAP, and the fact that many of the larger countries had 
become net contributors, a revision of the CAP was undertaken in 1984. 
France, for which the CAP had been created, was now a net contributor. 
Britain had a high contribution rate compared to the benefits that it 
received, because it is not a primarily agricultural nation (Weber and 
Wiesmeth 257). 
But despite its high cost, the EC could not allow the CAP to fold. 
An arrangement had to be made to bring spending under control. Finding 
this arrangement was extremely difficult because some nations would be 
affected differently than others — some more, some less, some 
positively and some negatively. Many of the nations were also unwilling 
to allow an EC agricultural program to replace a national one. 
In March 1984, decisions were made that set agricultural prices and 
also put controls on milk production. This decision had clear benefits 
for some nations. Britain, for example, was extremely pleased because 
its contribution would be lower. Selling the deal domestically was not 
a problem either since Britain has few farmers. For other nations, the 
results were not as pleasing. West Germany and France would both have 
difficult times selling this new package to their farmers. Therefore, 
additional compensations had to be added to appease the farmers of the 
EC. At the European Council meeting in 1984, agreements were reached 
that allowed Britain to reduce its contributions, while the Community 
budget was increased which could cover the increased cost of the 
additional compensations. This, in effect, solved the problem for the 
EC. 
This situation highlights several problems that the Council and 
Community face when handling Community business. First, one can see the 
decision-making process that had to go on. All EC institutions had a 
hand in setting the CAP levels. A Council Minister, a Commissioner, or 
a member state had to ask that new levels be set. The Commission had to 
suggest them in a draft, while the European Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee both gave opinions on the levels. Approval was 
given by the Council, but the process did not end there. Because of 
Britain's problems with its high contribution, the European Council had 
to make another package at its meeting in Fontainebleau. This agreement 
finally settled the issue of the CAP in 1984. 
The bargaining that went on is also an example of the political 
life that EC officials must deal with every day. Britain agreed to the 
CAP levels in exchange for some other budgetary provisions in other 
areas. Without this political maneuvering, the CAP may have taken much 
longer to settle. 
Perhaps the largest point that this particular situation shows is 
the theoretical conflict. The CAP is more or less a supranational type 
of agreement. The nations agree to allow the CAP regulations to 
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supersede their domestic regulations, regardless of the effects. All 
nations would have the same agricultural subsidy levels, and would allow 
the Community and its institutions to set those limits. However, the 
approach that nearly all nations took was more intergovernmental. None 
really wanted to agree to a Community-wide CAP. Agriculture is an area 
of vital interest to some nations. According to Weber and Wiesmeth, 
whenever a nation sees an area as vital, it prepares its internal 
position and makes its argument a tight one so that no other nation will 
be able to find any weaknesses in it. Also, when the national 
governments meet, the nation will try to preserve its interests as best 
it can (Weber and Wiesmeth 259). This is exactly what happened on both 
sides of the CAP issue. Britain tried to protect its national interest 
by seeking to decrease its contribution to the CAP, and France and West 
Germany sought to protect their national interests by trying to raise 
the levels or gain additional compensation for their farmers. 
Meanwhile, the goal of the Community is to move towards a closer union 
of states, which is at least partially a supranational goal. Until 
nations resolve questions concerning the Community's basic theoretical 
framework, these sort of contradictions will appear again and again. 
The European Monetary Union 
The creation of the EMU was largely a response by France and other 
nations to the German domination of the European Monetary System (EMS). 
These nations wanted a greater say in monetary issues. The EMU would 
give the nations that. 
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By the late 1980s, the EMS had done much of what it was designed to 
do: lower inflation and stabilize exchange rates (Sandholtz 27). But 
the French government felt that the currency adjustment policy favored 
the country with the weakest currency. Also, the French felt that the 
German government had an unfair advantage when adjustments had to be 
made. While other nations struggled when the German Bundesbank made 
adjustments, the Germans only had to consider the domestic effects. 
In 1988, the French proposed the creation of the EMU, arguing that 
Europe should avoid having one country set economic and monetary 
policies for all" (Sandholtz 29). Governments in Italy, Belgium and the 
Netherlands expressed similar concerns. 
For the French, a new monetary arrangement would increase their 
power politically and economically. One might expect opposition from 
the Germans, but they chose to support the union as well. Why the 
Germans chose to support this union is puzzling. Some attribute the 
support to Chancellor Helmut Kohl's promotion of integration throughout 
the 1980s, and to the fact the Germany had little to lose. It was 
already the most solid country economically and arguably the most 
powerful politically. Any move toward closer union would probably be in 
Germany's best interest as well. 
The real problem arose over which sort of union to choose. The EC 
could choose a union that did not require it to belong to any fixed rate 
mechanism or currency union. The idea was that a central bank would be 
able to monitor monetary policy without being pressured by political 
sources. The bank would be obligated to pursue low inflation rates as a 
goal, setting the example for the national banks. The nations would 
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also tie their currency to the strongest currency. When searching for 
examples of national banks that have met this criteria, the obvious one 
is that of Germany's Bundesbank. This would put the EC in basically the 
same position it was already in, with Germany dominating. 
A second choice would be for the EC to stay the course it had 
already chosen. The current monetary system allows the nations to keep 
their currencies within a certain fluctuation. These are freely flowing 
exchange rates. While there are benefits such as being able to adjust 
for the weaknesses of some nations' currencies, there is little reason 
to choose this path because of the problems that were voiced by France 
and other governments concerning German domination. 
A third choice is monetary integration. The end goal of this union 
is a common currency and a system of central banks (Sandholtz 15). This 
plan would also make it easier for nations to maintain a low inflation 
rate, a goal of the EC members. 
In 1989, Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, released a 
report on monetary union. There were several key stages. Stage one 
included completing the internal market. Stage two planned for the 
creation of European central banks and for the narrowing of fluctuation 
margins in the exchange rate. Stage three called for fixed rates and a 
single currency. From this report, it appeared that the third option, 
monetary integration, had been chosen. But opposition to the plan 
sprang up. The British were firmly against such a union, but stood 
alone in their opposition. 
In 1990, when the final details were being worked out, some 
conflicts among member nations arose. Germany, the Netherlands, and 
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Britain favored strict conditions — that there was no move to the EMU 
until a number of states had met specific, rigid economic conditions. 
France, Italy, Greece, and Spain favored looser criteria. More problems 
arose over the issue of implementation. Some nations would be allowed 
to join later. Germany and the Netherlands supported a core of strong 
nations to join first and create a "two-speed" Europe. Greece, Ireland, 
and Italy were opposed to this, mainly because they would be in the 
second tier. No decision has been made, although one of the provisions 
of Maastricht was a monetary union similar to the one proposed by 
Jacques Delors. 
This situation illustrates several problems. First, the decision- 
making process in this situation is very slow. The issue was first 
discussed in 1989 and four years later, it has still not been resolved. 
There are several reasons for this. The channels that a decision such 
as this has to go through slow the process tremendously. It must first 
pass through all the institutions of the EC; then it must pass through 
all the institutions of the member nations. Some national governments 
are not strongly in favor of the union; therefore, any action on the 
issue is not a top priority. The various details that have to be worked 
out also take a tremendous amount of time. Granted, the issue is one of 
great importance, but it shows how hard it is to get twelve nations to 
agree on anything. Implementation is also difficult. Again, because 
some nations do not wish to establish this union, they are slow to 
implement any legislation on the issue. At the present time, the EC has 
no real power to force the member governments to implement decisions. 
Slow or no implementation could prove to be a major stumbling block in 
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the institution of the European Monetary Union. Also, not all nations 
are on the same level economically and this makes it more difficult to 
implement monetary policy. 
Ties to national governments are also a burden here. If the 
national governments are against the EMU, a Minister who votes for the 
union may find himself out of a job when he returns home. It is hard to 
make decisions for the Community when so much of the effects will be 
felt back home. 
Conclusion 
The problems discussed in this chapter are very serious ones, for 
the Council and the Community. The examples given show the problems in 
real Community circumstances. If these problems continue to exist, 
there could be even more sever obstacles in the years to come. 
Solutions must be found if the Community is to continue to flourish and 
move towards its goal of integration. 
Chapter Five 
Challenges and Prospects 
As with any problem, there are few, if any, hard and fast 
solutions. Finding any sort of possibility for resolving a conflict is 
a very positive step towards the promise of a settlement. Most of the 
challenges discussed in the previous chapter are interrelated and 
finding a resolution to one may provide a remedy for several of them. A 
government structured similarly to that of the European Community is 
often difficult to change. Existing structures simply are not made to 
bend and change. Once an institution is in place, the path that 
reformations must take is a long and arduous one. Instead of a rule 
being changed by the creators of an institution, the change must be 
approved by all institutions involved. This can be nearly impossible 
because of political infighting. Changes in rules would entail a 
virtually complete restructuring of the rules of the Community and may 
take more time and energy than they are actually worth. This does not 
mean that reform is an inconceivable goal. The key is to have positive 
changes take place and to have troublesome areas corrected in such a way 
that will benefit the Community as a whole. 
Reform of (Xialified Voting 
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One of the areas that needs the biggest reformation is the 
assignment of votes in the qualified majority voting system. This is a 
logical choice for a revision. Those nations with larger land areas and 
larger populations are more affected by Community decisions, because 
more people are touched by the decisions. It stands to reason that the 
larger nations should have more votes. It could be argued that the 
voting structure simply evens the field for the larger nations. The 
smaller nations are poorer and less powerful politically and 
economically. The current voting structure gives them a voice in 
Community decisions. In actuality, it gives them too great a voice in 
Council decisions. Sixteen percent of the population can block a 
decision made by eighty-four percent of the population. Sixteen percent 
is not a majority by any definition. This issue will grow even more 
important when more smaller nations are admitted to the Community. 
What needs to happen is a restructuring of the voting system. The 
larger nations should have more votes. Instituting this system is 
easier said than done. Finding a structure that will represent the 
nations equally will be a difficult proposition. Granting a set number 
of votes per each nation would give the smaller nations the same voice 
as the larger ones. This would be equal technically, but would not 
correct the problem because the smaller nations would still be over- 
represented as they are in the current system. Granting a certain set 
number of votes per a certain number of population would be one possible 
prospect, but could leave tiny Luxembourg with a fraction of a vote. If 
one vote per five hundred thousand were granted, Luxembourg would have 
eight-tenths of a vote and Germany would have one hundred and sixty. 
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This sounds like a huge difference in votes, but it is the only way that 
a true equality based on population could be achieved. 
Whatever direction is chosen, it will be difficult to sell to the 
smaller nations of the EC. They know that they are ovei—represented and 
do not wish to concede this little bit of power that they have. The 
smaller nations will be even more reluctant to see a change once more 
smaller nations join. The new additions would simply increase their 
power. Discussions concerning voting changes should begin now; waiting 
will only worsen the problem and make it more difficult to be dealt 
with. 
Streamlining Decision-making 
Another troubled area of the Council concerns decision-making. The 
current process is so long and drawn out that it is amazing that 
decisions get made at all. The decision concerning the monetary union 
has been discussed since 1988 and still has not really been decided. 
While one can see the desirability of having all the Community 
institutions involved, it simply does not make for appropriate, timely 
decision-making. The Commission is involved in two different stages, 
the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament are only 
advising bodies but can block decisions, and the Council, which is 
supposed to be the more powerful of the institutions, cannot even 
introduce its own proposals. The Council must wait for the Commission 
to propose any possible legislation. A smoother system would definitely 
promote better and quicker decisions. 
68 
One possibility is the reassignment of duties within the 
institutions. The Economic and Social Committee could be consulted in 
the creating of legislation so that their opinions could be expressed 
beforehand which would lessen delays down the road when the proposal is 
supposed to be considered by the Committee. The European Parliament 
could be given more power and be allowed to vote on subjects just as the 
Council is. This would create a sort of tri-cameral system with the 
Council and the Commission playing roles in the approval process as 
well. All three could collectively make proposals and pass them, and 
see to their implementation. This is not a very feasible plan because 
the length of time such a process would take would not really streamline 
anything. Such a reassignment of duties would also be difficult because 
the powerful institutions such as the Council would not want to 
relinquish any of their powers. 
Such an action does not correct another related difficulty of the 
Community and the Council — the number of people who are involved in 
the decision-making process. The leaders of the original Community did 
not want any one institution to dominate the others, but the checks that 
were put into this system inhibit the functions of the Community and the 
Council. The decision-making process is so slow, and the number of 
people involved is one of the main reasons. There is another possible 
resolution. If the number of people involved in each decision were 
streamlined, the process might be quicker and more productive. If a 
system were designed where all decisions did not have to go through all 
Community institutions, this could also speed up decision-making. The 
Council could be assigned some areas and the Commission could be 
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assigned others. The Parliament could serve as a supervisory body, 
making sure that all Community rules are followed and that the 
institutions are functioning as they should. This way, the checks and 
balances of the Community would still be in place and the process could 
be considerably shorter. Such a change could take place, but a total 
restructuring of Community procedures would have to occur. This is an 
unlikely solution. Such a system has not been tried before in a modern 
government of any sort, a fact which lessens its acceptability. 
The Presidency of the Council 
The presidency of the Council is an extremely important position in 
the Community. The president's leadership is essentially the leadership 
for Europe in that six month rotation. Poor decisions could stunt the 
Community for years, while good ones could make the Community grow. 
Such a decision is too important to leave to a mere rotation. A country 
is in power only once every six years in this manner. This is 
particularly troubling to the larger countries which are already under- 
represented in the Council. With the possibility of some of the 
Scandinavian and Eastern European countries joining, the wait could be 
even longer. 
There are also questions of leadership to be considered. Not every 
Minister will necessarily be a good leader. Often a nation's type of 
government will be different than the others, leading to concerns over 
the leadership of the Community for that six months. This is currently 
the situation in the EC. Greece is scheduled to assume the presidency 
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on January 1, 1994. Greece's recent elections put the Socialists back 
in power. Andreas Papandreou is Greece's Prime Minister once again and 
will be heading the al1-important General, or Foreign, Affairs Council. 
His cabinet is filled with old friends, some sick with cancer, others 
convicted of corruption when previously in office ("Old Men Forget" 57). 
Papandreous' radical Socialist past, coupled with his ill health, 
previous political and sex scandals, and colorful Cabinet, make Greece 
an unstable government in the eyes of many in the EC. The leadership 
that Greece provides over the next term is very important, especially 
considering the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, which in many 
ways completes European unity. The EC's fear over the Greek presidency 
is an example of how important good leadership is to the success of the 
Community. 
How to reform these areas is nearly impossible. The EC cannot 
control the outcomes of national elections, so problems like the Greek 
presidency cannot be avoided. A rotation seems to be the fairest, 
albeit not always the best, way to choose the president of the Council. 
The issue concerning the length of time between a nation's presidencies 
is another unsolvable problem. Nothing can be done to shorten the time 
span for one country without lengthening it for another. The 
difficulties of the presidency are ones the Community will have to live 
with. 
Number of Meetings 
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The number of meetings that take place each month in the Council 
put each Minister under a tremendous workload. The people handling the 
decisions for a political entity as important as the European Community 
should be clear thinking. After several long sessions, the Minister may 
find that clear-headedness has abandoned him. 
The only way to help this situation is to reduce the number of 
meetings each Minister attends each month. This could affect the 
decision-making process, slowing it even more, but could likely force 
the Ministers to make their meetings more productive. The agendas of 
the meetings would have to be clearer and more concise and the 
discussions would have to be shorter and more succinct. Shorter 
discussions could be a drawback, but long discussions can cause more 
harm than good. Limits on meetings would also stop people from trying 
to block legislation by stretching out meetings by long speeches and 
other means. Late night meetings may cause bleary-eyed Ministers to 
agree to proposals they do not truly believe in. Limits on meetings 
could end this practice as well. 
Closer Coordination of Ministers 
To this point, most of the reforms mentioned have been 
institutional ones, within the political structures of the Community. 
There are changes that the member nations can make as well. 
One of the most trying things to do for the member nations is to 
coordinate the various Ministers' positions. The member nations could 
require the Ministers to circulate among their fellow Ministers from the 
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same state what issues they were discussing and what position is being 
taken. This way, when issues come up in other Councils as they often 
do, no crossed wires will cause embarrassing situations for member 
states. 
The complication with this possible prospect is the additional work 
the circulations would add. Ministers have enough paperwork to do 
without adding another task. These consultative meetings could also 
take away from time spent on Community business. The overflow of work 
would fall on COREPER. It would be up to COREPER to perform the 
necessary tasks in the Minister's absence. If for some reason the tasks 
are not performed adequately, Community progress could suffer. Despite 
the added paperwork and other factors, this intra-country consultation 
would be the best and most viable prospect and could be more easily 
instituted. 
Ties to National Governments 
This challenge is not an easy one either. The obvious way to 
handle it is to let the Ministers do Community business without any 
political ties to their national governments. In both of the examples 
concerning the CAP and the EMU, decision-making was made more difficult 
because of national ties. Without political ties it would mean that a 
Minister could vote without having to face national government 
punishment for voting for something that was in the interest of the 
Community and not the member nation. This will not likely happen. The 
Ministers are extensions of the national governments and will always be 
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so, until chosen and employed exclusively by the European Community. 
Part of the job of a Minister is to represent his nation and to 
institute the changes mentioned here would require rewriting the 
Ministers' job description. Relaxing the ties between Minister and 
member state would make the Minister's job a little easier and the 
Community's progress a little quicker. When the Council meets, the 
Ministers could cultivate a sort of EC culture. This would help the 
Minsters lose some of their national affiliations and feel more like 
European Community statesmen than just extensions of their national 
governments. 
Package Dealing 
What may be a prospect for helping in many if these challenges is 
package dealing. The leader of the institution, in this case the 
Council President, sets up a deal of carefully selected items. The 
package is attractive to all member states, but in order to have the 
deal passed, surrender on one or two longstanding issues is required. 
This was the situation with the CAP in 1984. Britain surrendered on the 
CAP contributions somewhat and received consideration in other budgetary 
areas. It is one of the more efficient ways of gaining decisions on 
issues. The problem with this approach is that there has to be a 
backlog of decisions with which to work. The president may be in this 
situation only once in his six-month term, limiting the use of such a 
measure (de Bassompierre 35). 
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Theoretical Concerns 
What most of the challenges boil down to is a theoretical conflict. 
The goals of the Community are supranational ones, while the 
institutions are primarily intergovernmental ones. To deal with this 
conflict would require a totally new mindset for the nations of the EC. 
This would take much time and effort. The chance that the nations will 
suddenly change their minds about total integration is slim. 
Nevertheless, until this theoretical conflict is resolved, many of the 
difficulties that the Council and the Community face will continue to be 
problems. 
Conclusion 
The prospects mentioned here are by no means all of the 
possibilities. Some are workable, some are not. Yet all of them are 
useful in the sense that it will cause a reexamination of the processes 
and policies of the Community and perhaps cause other, better, and more 
useful possibilities to be found. 
Chapter Six 
Conclusions 
This paper has been an effort to analyze the Council of Ministers, 
explain their functions and behaviors, target challenging areas, and 
offer possibilities to help deal with these problems. The decision- 
making process of the European Community is a long and slow process. 
While the Council plays a tremendous role in the process, all of the 
Community institutions are involved. This inclusion was intended to 
keep any one institution, namely the Council, from becoming too 
powerful, but what it has really done is slow decisions to a snail's 
pace. 
The challenges of the Council are many, but none are completely 
impossible to alleviate, at least partially. The large amount of 
workload placed on the Ministers makes good decision-making difficult. 
The complexity of the issues discussed, along with the complexity of the 
Council itself, makes decisions more difficult as well. The large 
number of people involved in the process, 731 people at least, makes the 
jobs of the Council and the other Community institutions much more 
difficult. Unequal power distributions concerning the qualified 
majority voting keeps the larger nations unequally represented in the 
Council. The Ministers are technically extensions of the national 
governments and must answer to them, but are expected to make decisions 
that further the Community no matter what. This is a difficult 
situation for any politician to be in. Because of these problems, the 
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presidency of the Council is an almost impossible job to execute. 
For every problem, there is a solution somewhere. Chapter Four 
offers some solutions to these problems. A reassignment of the votes 
for qualified voting in the Council is a must if all nations are to have 
an equitable voice. Streamlining the number of people involved in the 
decision-making process would help speed the process. A limited number 
of meetings would make the meetings more productive and the Ministers 
less overworked. If Ministers were allowed to be responsible to 
Community institutions only instead of to national governments, the 
Ministers could be more free to serve Community interests instead of 
national interests, making EC decision-making a less trying situation. 
There are virtually innumerable steps the Community and the Council 
could take in the future. The EC has progressed quite far in the 
thirty-six years since its inception, yet its goal of complete unity 
has not been met. The Community has evolved over time to meet the 
member nations changing needs, and the Council has evolved as well. The 
Council will continue to be the more powerful of the institutions, but 
its hands are tied by the challenges discussed in this paper. Hopefully 
the Community will find ways to aid the Council in its decision-making 
processes. The Council has the potential to be a driving force for 
integration in the Community. At every meeting the Ministers discuss 
issues vital to the existence of the Community. The EC needs to take 
steps to help the Council be freed from the chains which bind it, and be 
able to take its place among the European Community institutions as the 
leader fighting to see the goal of a unified Community achieved. 
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